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ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINIONS
The Authority To Issue An Attorney General's Opinion
The Attorney General of Mississippi is empowered by the law of
this state to issue written answers to questions posed by authorized
persons. Section 7-5-25, Miss. Code Ann. (1972) sets forth a list of
those authorized to request such opinions. In general, the list includes
the governor, the legislature, the chancery and circuit court clerks,
the secretary of state, the various state departments, state officers and
commissioners operating under the laws of this state, the heads and
trustees of state institutions, district attorneys, the various county and
city officials and their attorneys.
The Attorney General's Opinions function as a protective mea-
sure, so that there can be no civil or criminal liability against any per-
son or governmental entity who has properly requested the opinion,
setting forth all governing facts on the basis of which the Attorney
General's Office has prepared and delivered a legal opinion, and
which the requesting party has followed in good faith. This general
proposition holds true, unless a court of competent jurisdiction, after
a full hearing, shall judicially declare that such opinion is manifestly
wrong and without substantial support. No opinion shall be given or
considered if said opinion is given after suit is filed or prosecution
begun.
Issuance Of An Attorney General's Opinion*
Attorneys in the Attorney General's Office are assigned to specific
areas of law in which they specialize. After an opinion request is
received by the Office of the Attorney General, it is assigned to the at-
torney whose area of law it might concern. He then researches the
problem and prepares a draft of the opinion or answer. This draft is
then submitted to the Opinion Committee which is composed of nine
attorneys in the office, including the Attorney General. The Opinion
Committee meets twice weekly, on Tuesday and Thursday. At the
meeting of the Committee, the draft is discussed and reviewed. The
Committee either suggests changes, requests more information, or ap-
proves the draft if it is agreed that the analysis of the law is correct.
Should changes be suggested or more information requested, the
Committee sends the draft back to the attorney for revision. Upon
correction or addition, the draft is returned to the Committee where it
is again processed. If there are no further changes, additions, or cor-
rections suggested, the draft will be given final approval and issued as
an official Attorney General's Opinion.
*Prepared by Attorney General's Office
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OPINION NO. CR 79-01
SUBJECT. FORCE TO BE USED IN ARRESTS. Even though a
person may escape arrest, a law enforcement officer still owes that
person a duty to exercise reasonable care not to intentionally injure
him. Thus, in a pursuit a law enforcement officer must not discharge
his firearm in an effort to cause physical injury except to save the of-
ficer's own life or to prevent harm to himself.
DATE RENDERED: October 5, 1978
REQUESTED BY. Mr. L. H. Ramage
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by Oscar P.
Mackey, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General A. F. Summer has received your letter dated
September 30, 1978, requesting an opinion from this office and has
referred it to the undersigned for research and reply.
To avoid any possible misunderstanding and for future reference,
please permit me to quote the text of your inquiry, which is as follows:
Recently there has been much controversy regarding resistance to
arrest. If I have a warrant for arrest and the subject is placed under
arrest but breaks loose, and is ordered to stop and he refuses-what
measures then can I use to stop him?
Do I have authority to shoot to stop him or must I just let him go?
It seems no one feels safe in demanding him to stop.
If subject is shot then he gets the axe, so I feel the need for
reassurance in this controversy.
Based on the decisions of our Supreme Court, it is the opinion of
this office that an officer owes a fugitive a duty to exercise reasonable
care and precaution not to injure him and he must not intentionally
shoot him nor must he discharge a firearm while in pursuit in such a
manner as to cause injury in arresting or preventing escape and may
exert such physical force as is necessary to effect arrest by overcoming
resistance he encounters but cannot take the life of an accused or in-
flict upon him great bodily harm except to save the officer's own life
or to prevent harm to himself. Holland v. Martin, 56 So.2d 398
(1952). A custom among police officers is to fire their pistols when
pursuing fugitives, even though they are misdemeanants, as a ruse to
prevent their further flight, is illegal as a reckless use of firearms.
State v. Cunningham, 65 So. 115 (1914).
An officer, in attempting to arrest a misdemeanant, may use force
necessary to overcome resistance encountered but is not justified in
resorting to the use of firearms except to protect himself from
reasonably apparent bodily harm or death at misdemeanant's hands.
Holland v. Martin, 58 So.2d 62 (1952).
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Trusting this is adequate to answer your inquiry and with kindest
personal regards, I remain
Yours very truly,
A. F. SUMMER, A'ITORNEY GENERAL
BY:
C Oscar P. Mackey
Special Assistant Attorney General
OPM:hs
OPINION NO. SO. 79-01
SUBJECT: AUTHORITY OF COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICTS
TO SIGN NOTES OF INDEBTEDNESS. There is now authority in
Mississippi for the trustees of public school districts to sign notes of in-
debtedness. Such a transaction would be null and void since the
legislature has never granted such authority to the public school
districts.
DATE RENDERED: May 29, 1978
REQUESTED BY: Hon. Robert Oswald
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by George M.
Swindoll, Assistant Attorney General
*Full test of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Summer has received your letter of request
dated May 23, 1978, and has assigned it to me for research and reply.
In your letter you state as follows:
"The St. Martin High School Band Association has purchased
uniforms for the members of the band and has raised $5,000 to apply
on the total purchase price of $20,000. They state that years in the
past, the school board, as such, had endorsed with them a note
guaranteeing payment of the remaining balance when prior purchases
of band uniforms were made. They have now requested the school
board to endorse a note with them for the balance of $15,000. The
uniforms which are purchased will be left with the school and will be
utilized by future band members. The Band Association plans to pay
off the remaining balance of $15,000 over a period of approximately
three years by having fund-raising activities each year for that pur-
pose.
Will you please advise me whether the school board may lawfully sign
or endorse such a note on behalf of the Jackson County School
District."
There is no legal authority in the State of Mississippi for trustees of
public school districts to borrow money or sign notes or certificates of
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indebtedness to secure the purchase of any equipment used by the
pupils or employees of the school district. If such is done, the school
district is not liable for payment since the legislature has not granted
authorization therefor. In addition, there is no authority for the
trustees to enter into installment purchase contracts beyond the fiscal
year in which any supplies or equipment are purchased unless such is
by lease purchase agreement duly and lawfully entered into.
With kind regards, I am
Very truly yours,





OPINION NO. CV 79-01
SUBJECT TAX DEEDS. Under the guidelines of Sections
27-45-23 and 27-43-1 et seq., Miss. Code Ann. (1972), a tax purchaser
has the right to demand a tax deed from the Chancery Clerk if the
time has matured from the date of the tax sale. Just like the prior
owner, the tax purchaser has the same responsibility to protect his in-
terest by paying property taxes as they become due. He too may lose
the land as a result of his own failure to pay the property taxes, fol-
lowed by a tax sale and a subsequent maturation of the sale, whereby
the new tax purchaser is entitled to tax deed.
DATE RENDERED: May 22, 1978
REQUESTED BY. Hon. Joe Moore
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by William
James Cole III, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Summer has received your opinion request and
has assigned it to the undersigned for research and reply.
In your letter you state:
Section 27-45-23 of the Mississippi Code of 1972 states in part that
when the period of redemption has expired, the Chancery Clerk shall,
on demand, execute deeds of conveyance to individuals purchasing
land at tax sales.
On the 15th day of September, 1975, the County Tax Collector, at
the 1975 Tax Sale for Delinquent 1974 Taxes, sold a parcel of land to
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an individual. As required by Section 27-43-1 et seq. I notified the
owners of the sale, and they did not redeem the land by the expiration
date of the redemption period.
As of this 29th day of April, 1978, I have not executed a deed of
conveyance to the individual purchasing the land. Said individual is a
non-resident of Mississippi, and he has not made a demand in any form
on me to execute the tax deed.
Should I have already executed a tax deed to the purchaser
although he has not made any demand whatsoever? If the purchaser
must make some form of demand before the Clerk executes a tax deed,
then is there a limit to a period in which the purchaser must make such
a demand? Should a demand be required to be made before a tax deed
is executed, and such a demand not be made within some reasonable
period of time, then what should be the final disposition of the land
and the tax sale thereof?
The statute does not set a time limit upon which a tax purchaser
may make demand for his tax deed from the Chancery Clerk. It is the
opinion of this office that a tax purchaser would have a right to a tax
deed at any time after title has matured to him by virtue of the tax sale
and before title might vest in a subsequent tax purchaser.
In other words, if a tax purchaser has property from a tax sale
mature, then he acquires the right to demand a tax deed. However, if
after the maturity date, and the subsequent tax years the tax pur-
chaser fails to protect his interest by paying the taxes or purchasing
the property and the property sells to someone else, then upon expira-
tion of the period of redemption the subsequent tax purchaser ac-
quires a right to demand a tax deed. At that time of the subsequent
maturing sale and issuance of a tax deed, the previous tax purchaser
would no longer be entitled to a tax deed since it would vest nothing in
him since there had been an intervening tax sale.
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
William James( 9tble III
Special Assistant AttCrney General
WJCIII:lm
OPINION NO. CV 79-02
SUBJECT COUNTY SUPERVISORS; CONTRACTS WITH U.S.
GOVERNMENT: SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. The federal govern-
ment is immune from lawsuits in tort, except in instances where the
Federal Tort Claims Act shall apply. The state and its subdivisions
19791
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are also immune from tort liability, except in proprietary affairs and
where immunity has been abrogated by statute. See Owens v. Jackson
Municipal Separate School District, 264 So. 2d 892 (Miss. 1972).
DATE RENDERED: May 17, 1978
REQUESTED BY: Hon. William E. Ready
OPINION BY A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by John M.
Weston, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Your letter request of May 15, 1978, addressed to Honorable A. F.
Summer, Attorney General, has been received and assigned to this
writer for research and reply. Your letter states:
Pursuant to authority and direction so to do, I am writing to in-
quire as to the legality and propriety of a County Board of Supervisors
signing any contract with the U.S. Government or other entity if said
contract contains the following or similar language.
Release of claims. The Contractor agrees to hold and save the
Government, its officers, agents and employees, harmless from
liability of any nature or kind, for or on account of any claims for
damages that may arise during the performance of the law enforce-
ment services by the Contractor under this contract.
In addition to the Federal Government, numerous Mississippi
agencies include such a paragraph within most of their proposed con-
tracts and this local counsel feels that such provisions are an improper
and unauthorized attempt to pierce the County's immunity.
In many cases, the Board of Supervisors find it extremely difficult
to forego the signing of contracts containing such provisions because
of the large benefits to be derived for the public and the irrevocably
firm position of the other party to the proposed contract in including
such a provision.
This office has previously responded to a request of a similar
nature in an opinion by Honorable S. E. Birdsong, Jr., Special Assist-
ant Attorney General, to General Guy N. Rogers, dated March 14,
1978, involving a review of the terms and conditions of a contract
between the U.S. Government and the State of Mississippi as contrac-
tor to give funds to operate and maintain state-controlled Army Na-
tional Guard Annual and Weekend Training Sites.
Answering your specific inquiry, we quote verbatim from the
Rogers opinion:
IV. Liability And Indemnity.
The Contractor is required to indemnify and hold harmless the
Government and its agents from all claims, damage actions, and
judgments in tort cases, save in instances where the Federal Tort
Claims Act shall apply.
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The State and its subdivisions are immune from suit in tort actions
except in matters concerning proprietary affairs and where immunity
has been abrogated by Statute; such doctrine will not be abrogated.
Owens v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, et al, Miss., 264
So. 2d 892 (1972).
Owens is still the case law on this subject. There are no Mississippi
Statutes which abrogate this immunity.
With kind regards, I am
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
JohnM. Weston
Special Assistant Attorney General
JMW/ped
OPINION NO. SO 79-02
SUBJECT. BEER; DISPOSAL OF CONTRABAND. Section
25-1-5 1, Miss. Code Ann. (1972), requires that seized contraband is to
be turned over to the sheriff for sale. When beer or other contraband
is seized in a dry county, the sale may be made in an adjacent county
where possession is not illegal.
DATE RENDERED: May 10, 1978
REQUESTED BY. Hon. Mayo Grubbs
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by R. Hugo
Newcomb, Sr., Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Summer has received your letter of recent date
and assigned it to the undersigned for research and reply.
You ask, "If officers raid a place or search and find beer, is the
beer contraband? If the beer is contraband and seized, how should it
be disposed of?"
"Contraband" is the possession or transportation of anything pro-
hibited or excluded by law. Brinegar v. State, 262 P.2d 464, 477, 970
Okla. Cr. 299. (Implied but not specifically defined in Reynolds v.
State [1924] 136 Miss. 329, 101 So. 485, as cited according to defini-
tion and followed therein in Cofer v. State (1928) 118 So. 613.
Code Section 25-1-51 requires that all seized contraband property
be turned over to the sheriff for sale and prescribes the procedure to
be followed thereunder. Section 67-3-13 prohibits the possession of
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such beverage within dry counties. The sale could be made in an ad-
jacent county wherein the possession is not illegal, or, after judicially
authorized sale, could be delivered by the sheriff to the purchaser in
such adjacent county, or might be legally transported by such pur-
chaser in accordance with Section 67-3-67.
If, in the sound judicial discretion of the judge, the merchantable
value of such contraband should be determined to be insufficient to
meet the costs of advertising and sale, then it would follow that the
judge could order the sheriff to destroy (under necessary safeguards
and adequate inventories, receipts and reports) the contraband.
Sincerely,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: K l-w~
R. Hugo Newcomb, Sr.
Assistant Attorney General
RHN:hs
OPINION NO. SO 79-03
SUBJECT. JURISDICTION OF PRISONERS; MEDICAL AND
DENTAL SERVICES TO PRISONERS. A circuit court order in and
of itself does not make a subject a state prisoner. The subject must be
sentenced to the State Department of Corrections. The determination
of the jurisdiction in which a prisoner is to be confined will depend
upon how the prisoner is classified. For instance, city court can only
try misdemeanors. A felony becomes a circuit court case under the
jurisdiction of the county. A prisoner accused of a felony should be
immediately turned over by the city to be placed under the county's
jurisdiction.
Sections 47-1-57, 59, Miss. Code Ann. (1972), set forth the pro-
cedures for furnishing medical aid to prisoners. The board of super-
visors can authorize payment of reasonable medical bills incurred in
the treatment of prisoners.
DATE RENDERED: April 14, 1978
REQUESTED BY: Hon. James M. Hall
OPINION BY. A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by John M.
Weston, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Your letter request of April 6, 1978, addressed to Honorable A. F.
Summer, Attorney General, has been received and assigned to this
writer for research and reply. Your letter states:
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Enclosed are copies of doctor's and dental bills recently filed for
payment with the Board of Supervisors. Ruby Evans is incarcerated in
the Stone County Jail and was so incarcerated at the time these bills
were incurred. This incarceration is pursuant to the enclosed Order of
the Circuit Court dated December 20, 1977. Initially, the Board needs
to know whether the enclosed Circuit Court Order makes Ruby Evans
a state prisoner, rather than a county prisoner, such that her housing
and medical expenses would be paid by the state, rather than by the
county. If not, please tell us at what point in the criminal process a
prisoner, arrested by the city police and charged with a felony and
thereafter bound over to the Grand Jury by the City Judge upon
preliminary hearing, becomes a county, rather than a city prisoner,
and thus is to be maintained at county expense. Secondly, at what
point does a county prisoner, upon conviction of a felony, become a
prisoner to be maintained at state, rather than county expense.
Thirdly, I have reviewed Sections 47-1-57 & -59 of the Mississippi
Code with respect to payment of the enclosed doctor's and dental bills.
I find no authority whereby the county can pay Wiggins Clinic
anything other than $5.00 per visit, rather than the regular $8.00 of-
fice charge per visit, and therefore, request you to inform me whether
they could pay the additional $3.00 visit charge and also the apparent
$3.00 charge for the injection of February 13, 1978.
Finally, I find no authority for payment of a dental bill and ask
whether the county can pay a dentist $5.00 for a visit plus his
reasonable and necessary charges incurred in the x-rays and filling
work.
From the contents of your letter, we are unable to determine what
happened after the attached order was entered or what the present
status of the prisoner is.
However, based upon the information furnished, it is the opinion
of this office that:
l(a). The enclosed Circuit Court Order does not, in and of itself,
make the subject a state prisoner.
l(b). As to the city-county prisoner situation, we enclosed a prior
opinion of this writer to Hon. Frank M. Deramus dated April 1, 1975
which answers that question.
2. A person has to be sentenced to the Department of Corrections
before becoming a state prisoner.
3 & 4. Section 47-1-57 and -59 deal respectively with furnishing
medical aid to prisoners by calling in a doctor to treat him and
hospitalization expenses of prisoners. We note from the doctor bill
that the prisoner was not treated in the jail but was carried to the
clinic. It is the opinion of this office that dental treatment would fall
within the purview of medical attention. If the Board determines in
its sound discretion that the facts of the case justified carrying the
prisoner to the doctor and dentist and that the charges are not
unreasonable, then the Board can authorize payment of the bills in
question.
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In passing, we would observe that a failure to obtain medical
treatment for a prisoner could lay the sheriff and the county wide-
open to a civil suit for damages.
Trusting the above has answered your inquiries, I am
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
JohnM. Weston
Special Assistant Attorney General
JMW/ped
Enclosure
Attorney General Summer has your letter of request dated
February 3, 1975 and has assigned it to me for research and reply.
Your letter states as follows:
The problem presented is as follows: The County Jail in Winston
County, Mississippi, is used both by the city and county authorities. In
the past, after a city prisoner was bound over for Grand Jury action
the county authorities undertook the feeding of that prisoner. Recent-
ly, however, the county authorities refused to feed prisoners after they
are bound over by the city authorities for Grand Jury action.
The particular question upon which I would like to have an opi-
nion rendered is whether or not the city is required to feed city
prisoners after they are bound over for Grand Jury action or whether
this becomes the responsibility of the county authorities at such time.
Please prepare an opinion on the question posed in this letter as soon as
possible.
Section 47-1-39, Mississippi Code of 1972, Annotated, states in
pertinent part:
The governing authorities of municipalities shall have the
power . . . to contract with the board of supervisors, which is em-
powered in the premises, for the use of the county jail by the
municipality;...
The cited Section does not state the terms and conditions on which
a contract should be made.
It appears that the answer to what authority sustains the expense
of confinement of a prisoner confined in the county jail depends on
how the prisoner is classified-whether a municipal or county
prisoner.
In my opinion when a prisoner confined in the county jail is bound
over for grand jury action by a municipal authority who would be ac-
ting in his capacity as an ex-officio justice of the peace, the person
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would then become a prisoner of the county and the county governing
authorities should sustain the expense of confinement.
Trusting the above answers your inquiry and with all good wishes,
I am
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, A1rORNEY GENERAL
BY:
Special Assistant Attorney General
SEBjr:va
OPINION NO. SO 79-04
SUBJECT MUNICIPALITIES; NEPOTISM. Sections 31-7-39,
41, Miss. Code Ann. (1972), provides that municipal construction
contracts and repair work can be solicited only when the municipal-
ity has given ten days advertising notice. Section 21-39-1, Miss. Code
Ann. (1972), provides the guidelines whereupon conflicts of interest in
municipal projects are prohibited. Section 25-1-53, Miss. Code Ann.
(1972), sets forth the prohibition against nepotism in governmental
hiring and appointing. The prohibition extends to those persons
related by blood or marriage within the third degree to the person or
any member of the board of trustees having the authority to make
such appointment, when they would be paid out of public funds.
Section 21-3-15, Miss. Code Ann. (1972), sets forth the duties of
the mayor. The regular and special meetings of the board of
aldermen are guided by Sections 21-3-19, 2 1, Miss. Code Ann. (1972).
DATE RENDERED: April 12, 1978
REQUESTED BY. Mrs. Shirley Ellard
OPINION BY. A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by S. E. Bird-
song, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Summer has received your letter of April 3,
1978, and has assigned it to me for research and reply.
Your letter mentions several subjects relevant to the conduct of
municipal government including municipal contracts, hiring of
municipal employees, information about municipal business, fixing
salaries, meetings, water rates and municipal audits.
Several sections of the Mississippi Code of 1972 are relevant to
these subjects and their applicable provisions are set out below.
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Section 31-7-39 provides that municipal construction contracts
and real property repair work are let on bids solicited by advertising;
the following Section 31-7-41 provides for 10 days' notice in the
advertisement. Copies of these are enclosed for your convenience.
The relationship of municipal officers to municipal contracts is
specifically set out in Section 21-39-1 of the Code:
' Municipal officers and employees not to be interested in con-
tracts.
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of any municipality
to enter into or to have or to own any interest or share, individually or
as agent or employee of any person or corporation, either directly or
indirectly, in any contract made or let by the governing authorities of
such municipality for the construction or doing of any public work, or
for the sale or purchase of any materials, supplies, or property of any
description, or for any other purpose whatsoever, or in any subcon-
tract arising therefrom or connected therewith, or to receive, either
directly or indirectly, any portion or share of any money or other thing
paid for the construction or doing of any public work, or the sale or
purchase of any property, or upon any other contract made by the
governing authorities of the municipality, or subcontract arising
therefrom or connected therewith. In addition to the penalties
prescribed by law, any person violating the provisions of this
paragraph shall be removed from the office or employment then held
by him, and shall not be eligible to succeed himself.
No officer or employee of any municipality shall be personally in-
terested in the profits of any contract with the municipality .... No
elective officer of any municipality shall be in the service of any per-
son, firm, or corporation having contractual relations with such
municipality during his term of office. A violation of this paragraph
shall constitute a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, the person
violating same shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hun-
dred fifty dollars and, in addition, shall be removed from office. ...
Prohibition against nepotism in municipal appointment and hir-
ing are stated in Section 25-1-53:
.... Nepotism prohibited.
It shall be unlawful for any person elected, appointed, or selected
in any manner whatsoever to any state, county, district, or municipal
office, or for any board of trustees of any state institution to appoint or
employ, as an officer, clerk, stenographer, deputy, or assistant who is
to be paid out of the public funds, any person related by blood or mar-
riage within the third degree, computed by the rule of the civil law, to
the person or any member of the board of trustees having the authority
to make such appointment, or contract such employment as employer.
This section shall not apply to any employee who shall have been in
said department or institution prior to the time his or her kinsman,
within the third degree, became the head of said department or institu-
tion or member of said board of trustees.
[Vol. 1:223
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The prohibition applies only to the specific types of positions and
to persons related by blood or marriage within the third degree com-
puted by civil law. The statute does not apply to elected positions. A
wife is within the third degree. The brother of a daughter-in-law is
not within the third degree. A son is within the third degree.
The penalty for nepotism is stated in Section 25-1-55:
Any person violating the provisions of Section 25-1-53 shall forfeit
to the State of Mississippi, and shall be liable on his official bond for,
an amount equal to the sum of all moneys paid to any person ap-
pointed or employed in violation of the provisions aforesaid.
Pittsboro is classed as a Code charter municipality, or mayor-
alderman form of municipality. The office of mayor and the office of
alderman each have functions as prescribed by statute and decided by
case law; the first, being an executive office, and the second being a
legislative office.
Together the mayor and aldermen are the governing authorities.
In acting, these authorities are governed in the conduct of their duties
by the provisions of Section 21-3-15:
.... Duties of the mayor.
The mayor shall preside at all meetings of the board of aldermen,
and in case there shall be an equal division, he shall give the deciding
vote. He shall have the superintending control of all the officers and
affairs of the municipality and shall take care that the laws and or-
dinances are executed. He shall have power to veto, in writing, giving
his reasons therefor, any measure passed by the board of aldermen, but
a measure vetoed may be adopted notwithstanding, if two-thirds of the
aldermen vote therefor.
Acting accordingly, the governing authorities are empowered
under the provisions of Section 21-17-5 of the Code and the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court case of Alexander v. Edwards, 71 So. 2d 785
(Miss. 1954) to fix and to raise the salaries of municipal officers and
employees.
Information concerning municipal affairs may be communicated
to the governing authorities by the Mayor:
§ 25-15-7. Mayor-duty to give information to the governing
body.
The mayor shall from time to time communicate in writing, to the
governing body such information and recommend such measures as in
his opinion may lead to the improvement of the finances, the police,
health, security, ornament, comfort and general prosperity of the
municipality.
There are no statutes requiring audits of municipalities by the
State. However, there is no statutory prohibition against the Pitts-
boro governing authorities requesting an audit by the State Auditor of
Public Accounts.
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The regular and special meetings of the board of aldermen are
regulated by the provisions of Section 21-3-19 and 21-3-2 1, copies of
which are enclosed for your convenience.
We trust the above will be of assistance to you.
With kind regards, I am
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
S. E. Birdsong, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
SEBJr./mg
Enclosures
OPINION NO. SO 79-05
SUBJECT: MUNICIPALITIES; ACQUISITION OF STREETS. A
municipality can acquire use in a street by several methods. One
method is prescription. Prescription acquisition occurs after the road
has been habitually used by the public for a period of ten years. A
municipality may also acquire use in a street by grant or dedication
and by eminent domain. The municipality does not necessarily ob-
tain title in such instances, but only an easement. The acquisition of
"title in a street" by a municipality is a judgmental determination by
the board of aldermen and the courts.
DATE RENDERED: April 10, 1978
REQUESTED BY: Hon. Cason Rankin
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by Richard M.
Allen, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Summer has received your letter dated March
27, 1978 and assigned it to me for research and reply, your letter
stating:
Does a municipality gain any title in a street that has never been
dedicated by virtue of public use?
"The case" which I find on the subject is that of Gulf and S. I. R.
Co. v. Atkinson, 117 Miss. 118, 77 So. 954 (1918) wherein the court
states:
A highway is a road or way upon which all persons have the right
to travel at pleasure. It is the right of all persons to travel upon a road,
[Vol. 1:223
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and not merely their travelling upon it, that makes it a public road or
highway. This right may be acquired in various ways, one of which is
by prescription; but in order for it to be so acquired, the road must be
habitually used by the public in general for a period of ten years; and
such user must be accompanied by evidence, other then mere travel
thereon of a claim by the public of the right so to do....
Other ways a municipality may acquire a street are by grant (or
dedication) or by eminent domain. I would add that the municipality
does not get title to the street by the above methods, but only the
"easement" to use as used.
For a recent general discussion, see Medina v. State Ex Rel. Sum-
mer, 354 So. 2d 779 (Miss. 1977).
As to whether your municipality has gained "title in a street" in
this particular instance is a judgmental decision to be made by the
Board, based on all the facts as reflected by the above cited cases,
relative to which a final determination may only be made by a court
of competent jurisdiction.
Hoping the above will be of some help and thanking you for giving
this office this opportunity to be of service to you, I remain
Yours very truly,
A. F. SUMMER, ATFORNEY GENERAL
BY: f,/;,.a
Richard M. Allen
Special Assistant Attorney General
RMA/ped
OPINION NO. SO 79-06
SUBJECT: OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL LEASES ON SIX-
TEENTH SECTION LAND. Section 29-3-99, Miss. Code Ann.
(1972), was recently amended by Senate Bill 2430 to allow the respec-
tive county boards of education to lease sixteenth section lands for the
exploration of oil, gas, and other minerals. Prior to the amendment,
this power was held by the respective county boards of supervisors.
The amendment empowers the board of education to oversee and
supervise bidding, lease terms, drilling, royalties, and production of
the lease.
DATE RENDERED: April 3, 1978
REQUESTED BY: Mr. E. L. Robbins
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by William
James Cole III, Special Assistant Attorney General
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*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Summer has received your opinion request and
has assigned it to the undersigned for research and reply.
In your letter you state:
Enclosed is copies of two orders adopted by the Pearl River County
Board of Supervisors on May 8, 1970 and January 11, 1974.
We would like you to render a legal opinion on whether or not a
16th Section lease subleased by lessee, after the above mentioned
orders and without the approval of the Board of Supervisors, is legal.
The particular parts of the two orders in question are stated as
follows:
That any lease on Sixteenth Section Lands in Pearl River County,
Mississippi, may not be, other than those permitted by law to be leased
for a gross rental, transferred or assigned by the Lessee without the
written consent of the Board of Supervisors of Pearl River County.
' ' * that no sixteenth section lease may be transferred, assigned or
subleased without the approval of the Board of Supervisors of Pearl
River County and if any lease is transferred, assigned or subleased
without the approval of the Board of Supervisors of Pearl River
County then that lease is automatically cancelled and void.
As you know, the Legislature has adopted and sent to the Gover-
nor Senate Bill 2430 which materially amends the various 16th Sec-
tion Land statutes. The legislation, upon signature by the Governor is
to take effect July 1, 1978.
This bill contains provisions which are directly related to the ques-
tion you present.
Section 31, Page 32, of the bill states:
Sub-leasing or assignment of any lease of school trust lands ex-
ecuted after July 1, 1978, shall only be allowed when provided in the
lease contract or at the discretion of the board of education; provided
that permission to sublease or assign shall not be arbitrarily withheld.
Under the provisions of this act subleasing will only be permitted
when so allowed by the terms of the lease or upon approval of the
Board of Education within its discretion.
We would note that this applies only to leases executed after July
1, 1978. Leases already in existence cannot be altered by the Board of
Supervisors or Board of Education.
A lease agreement is a contract and under authority of law the
Board can determine the terms and conditions of the lease contract in
accordance with state law.
After a contract is made, the terms and conditions of the contract
cannot be unilaterally altered so as to destroy or limit a right that has
been vested under the contract.
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Once a lease has been executed, it continues on the terms and con-
ditions in existence at the time of execution and upon which it was ex-
ecuted.
I trust that this information will be of assistance to you.
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
William lame .'Cole III
Special Assistant A torney General
WJCIII:lm
OPINION NO. SO 79-07
SUBJECT: SUPERVISORS; HOSPITALIZATION INSURANCE;
SHERIFF'S INSURANCE. Section 25-25-101, Miss. Code Ann.
(1972), allows the Board of Supervisors of each county to determine
which types of group coverage they wish to secure. The privilege of
discretion, however, is subject to limitations. The cost of all group
coverages contributed by the governing board cannot exceed one hun-
dred percent of the coverage for employees only. Thus, the employee
must pay for his dependents' coverage himself. Also, all group in-
surance plans must be submitted to the Commission of Budget and
Accounting for approval.
Under Section 19-25-13, Miss. Code Ann. (1972), a county board
can purchase a Special Risk Accident Policy for the Sheriff if the
board determines that the policy is necessary, proper, and reasonable.
DATE RENDERED: March 8, 1978
REQUESTED BY. Mr. Carley R. Parker
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by John M.
Weston, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Your letter request of February 23, 1978, addressed to Honorable
A. F. Summer, Attorney General, has been received and assigned to
this writer for research and reply. Your letter states:
The authority given under Code Section 25-15-101 and 25-15-103,
to the Board of Supervisors to provide insurance for employees and
dependents, leaves some question as to what insurance is included.
Specifically these are:
1. Where group hospitalization is provided with major medical,
such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, may the county also provide
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group coverage for accidents and/or for cancer coverage where
either all, or part of the benefits are payable to the insured on
a per week or per month basis.
2. Is the county allowed to purchase a Special Risk Accident Pol-
icy for Sheriff and Deputies under the above, or any other sec-
tion of the Code, and if so, what are the limits for which the
county may pay.
For reference, § 25-15-101, Code of 1972, provides in part:
The governing board of any county.., are hereby authorized and
empowered in their discretion, to negotiate for and secure for all or
specified groups of employees and their dependents of such county...
a policy or policies of group insurance covering the life, health, acci-
dent and hospitalization, as well as a group contract or contracts
covering hospital and/or medical and/or surgical services or benefits
(including surgical costs, so-called 'hospital extras,' medical expenses,
allied coverages, and major medical costs) of such of its employees and
their dependents as may desire such insurance and other coverage
under such service or benefit contracts ..... In no instances shall the
amount of contributions by any governing board or head of a political
subdivision . . . exceed an average of one hundred percent (100%) of
the cost of all such group coverages for employees.
and the first paragraph of § 25-15-103 reads:
The maximum amount of group insurance or other coverage
used in determining employer's limitation of one hundred percent
(100%) of such costs shall be determined by regulations promulgated
by the governing board or head of any political subdivision, school
district, junior college district, institution, department or agency
named in section 25-15-101 and 25-15-103, but the life insurance for
each employee shall not be in excess of twenty thousand dollars
($20,000.000) or the amount of the employee's annual wage to the
next highest one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), whichever may be less
but in no case less than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), with a like
amount for accidental death; accident and health insurance, providing
benefits not exceeding forty percent (40%) of the employee's income
and in no case in excess of sixty dollars ($60.00) per week; hospitaliza-
tion benefits for room and board not exceeding the average semi-
private cost per day; and the other coverages authorized hereinabove.
In response to your first question, it is the opinion of this office that
the broad language of § 25-15-101 above-quoted leaves it up to the
Board to determine, in its discretion, as to just exactly what types of
coverage they wish to secure and provide for the employees and their
dependents, subject to the limitations of § 25-15-103, supra, and the
further limitation that the amount of such coverage shall be that
which is considered reasonable as determined by the Commission of
Budget and Accounting.
Additionally, as provided in § 25-15-101, supra, the cost of all
group coverages for employees can be paid one hundred percent
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(100%) by the county but the employee must pay for dependents
coverage.
Concerning your second inquiry, our opinion is that § 19-25-13 is
applicable. Said section provides in part:
The sheriff shall, at the July meeting of the board of supervisors,
submit a budget of estimated expenses of his office for the ensuing
fiscal year beginning October I.... The board shall examine this pro-
posed budget and determine the amount to be expended by the sheriff
in the performance of his duties for the fiscal year and may increase or
reduce said amount as it deems necessary and proper.
The budget shall include amounts ... for insurance providing pro-
tection for the sheriff and his deputies in case of disability, death, and
other similar coverage ..... In addition, the budget shall include
amounts for the payment of premiums on ... and hospitalization in-
surance as provided for in section 25-15-101 and 25-15-103, Mississip-
pi Code of 1972.
Consequently, if the Sheriff requests in his submitted budget a
Special Risk Accident Policy for himself and his deputies and the
Board, in its discretion, determines the coverage and amount thereof
to be necessary, proper and reasonable, the County can purchase such
insurance.
Trusting this is responsive to your letter, I am
Sincerely,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL.
BY:A
John M. Weston
JMW/ped (Special Assistant Attorney General
OPINION NO. SO 79-08
SUBJECT: SUPERVISORS; AUTHORITY; ATTORNEYS FEES;
LIABILITIES FOR JUDGMENT AGAINST OFFICIALS. Under Sec-
tion 19-3-47, Miss. Code Ann. (1972), if the county is interested in the
litigation, the board is authorized to pay such counsel a reasonable fee
for service in a civil suit. This would include a county officer who is
being sued in federal court for actions allegedly committed in the of-
ficial performance of his duties.
County law enforcement officials are required to be bonded. In
the event an official's bond is discontinued by the bonding company,
it is the responsibility of that official to secure another bond. If he is
unable to do so, he must submit two letters of refusal from the bond-
1979]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
ing companies and in turn, find two or more personal sureties as set
forth in Section 25-1-35, Miss. Code Ann. (1972).
Although a claimant may succeed in obtaining a judgment against
a county official, if the judgment exceeds the bond of the official, the
county would not be liable for any of the judgment. This is due to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity does have its exceptions when the county is a party defen-
dant in federal court. See Monell v. City of New York, - U.S.
-, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978); County of Lincoln v, Luning, 133 U.S.
529 (1890).
DATE RENDERED: March 8, 1978
REQUESTED BY. Hon. Gilford F. Dabbs, III
OPINION BY. A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by John M.
Weston, Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Your letter request of February 27, 1978, addressed to Honorable
A. F. Summer, Attorney General, has been received and assigned to
this writer for research and reply. Your letter states:
The Board of Supervisors of Clarke County have several questions
concerning attorney fees, expenses and liability in regard to lawsuits
filed against the Sheriff and/or his Deputies of Clarke County.
Therefore, on behalf of the Board of Supervisors of Clarke County,
Mississippi, I would like your opinion on the following:
1. If the Sheriff of Clarke County and/or a Deputy Sheriff of
Clarke County were sued in a civil rights action in Federal Court for
actions they allegedly committed in their official performance of
duties as Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff during the term of office, may the
Board pay all attorney fees and expenses incurred in the defense of this
suit?
2. If at any time should the bonding company of an official discon-
tinue its bond, whose responsibility is it to see that the official is bond-
ed?
3. In any suit filed against an official, the possibility exists that if
the claimants were successful and obtained a judgment which would
exceed the bonds of the official, then would the county be liable for
any part of this judgment or could the county, in its discretion, pay
any or all of said judgment?
In answer to your first question, we enclose a copy of an opinion
from Mrs. Mary Libby Payne, Assistant Attorney General, to
Honorable Pat M. Barrett, Attorney for the Lexington County Board
of Supervisors.
The enclosed copy interprets amended § 19-3-47(1)(b), Mississippi
Code of 1972, (formerly § 2958, Mississippi Code of 1942) and I
believe it will satisfactorily respond to your question.
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As for your second inquiry, if the bonding company should discon-
tinue its bond on a county official required to have bond, it would be
the responsibility of that official to secure another one, as it is a
necessary qualification for holding his office. In the event the official
was unable to secure such bond from a surety company authorized to
do business in this State, he may make his official bond as provided
under the last paragraph of § 25-1-35, Mississippi Code of 1972,
which reads:
Any such officer or deputy may make affidavit, such affidavit to in-
clude two letters of refusal of such bond by bonding companies li-
censed to do business in the State of Mississippi, that he has made a
diligent effort to obtain the surety bond required by this section and
was unable to do so. In such event, such officer or deputy may make
his official bond with two or more personal sureties, qualified as pro-
vided by law.
In response to your third question, it is the opinion of this office
that the county would not be liable. The doctrine of sovereign im-
munity is held by the Mississippi Supreme Court to extend to counties.
See headnote to Owens v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District,
264 So. 2d 892 (1972) and also State v. Sanders, 203 M. at 490, 35 So.
2d at 532-533. There the Court stated:
Thus it will be found, . . . that nearly all the cases, wherein the rule
of immunity from suit against the state, or a subdivision thereof, has
been applied and upheld, are those which demanded a money judg-
ment, and wherein the discharge of the judgment, if obtained, would
require an appropriation or an expenditure therefrom, which being
legislative in its character is a province exclusively of the political
departments of the state.
Additionally, sovereign immunity extends only to governmental
agencies and would not extend to the employee for his personal
negligence.
Furthermore, if the county paid any part of such judgment, it
would be in violation of § 66 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890.
Under certain particular circumstances, it should be noted that a
county is amenable to suit in Federal Court when the county is pro-
perly named as a party. See County of Lincoln v. Luning, 133 U.S.
529, 33 L. Ed. 766, 10 S.Ct. 363 (1890).
With kind personal regards, I am
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
JMW/ped C John M. Weston
Enclosure Special Assistant Attorney General
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Attorney General Summer has received your letter of request of
January 22, 1974, and has assigned it to the undersigned for research
and reply. In that letter you state:
A civil suit has been filed against the Sheriff of Holmes County,
three of his deputies and the Holmes County Coroner, all in their
respective official capacities. This suit arose from an incident in the
Holmes County Jail.
The Board of Supervisors feels that the County definitely has an in-
terest in this case as it will directly affect the law enforcement general-
ly in the County and the Board wishes to know if they may employ
counsel to assist these officers in the defense of this case.
In past opinions to John W. Dulaney, Jr., dated October 14, 1971,
and to Tom S. Lee, dated April 19, 1973, you will note that we have
said if the Board of Supervisors determines that the County "is in-
terested" in the litigation, that the Board is authorized to pay such
counsel a reasonable fee for service in the civil suit. Copies of those
two opinions are attached to this one for your information.
It is our continuing pleasure to serve you in your official capacity.
Please do not hesitate to call upon us in the future as the need should
require.
Yours most sincerely,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: "
(Mrs.) Mary Libby Payne
Assistant Attorney General
MLP:lm
enclosures: Opinion to Tom S. Lee, April 19, 1973
Opinion to John W. Dulaney, Jr., October 14, 1971
OPINION NO. SO 79-09
SUBJECT: CONSTABLES; JURISDICTION. A constable has
jurisdiction only within the limits of his district except in special situa-
tions. See Sections 99-3-13, 15, Miss. Code Ann. (1972). Where a
district does not have a qualified constable to perform said duties,
then process should be sent to the sheriff's office in accordance with
Section 11-9-107, Miss. Code Ann. (1972). Section 11-9-109, Miss.
Code Ann. (1972), allows the justice court judge of the respective
district to appoint someone in cases of emergency to execute process if
the constable or sheriff's office cannot be used. Such condition is on
an individual case basis only, not a blanket assignment.
DATE RENDERED: March 1, 1978
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REQUESTED BY. Hon. Flynn G. Wells
OPINION BY A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by R. Hugo
Newcomb, Sr., Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Summer has received your letter of request
dated February 22, 1978, and assigned it to the undersigned for
research and reply.
You refer to a situation wherein a constable is unable to perform
his duties by reason of illness. You also state that, "At the moment, a
reliable and trustworthy constable from an adjoining district has been
appointed to serve papers in said constable's absence," but that the
constable of your district will apparently be unqualified for some
time. You asked as to the proper procedure in such a case.
Before answering your question, it is necessary to correct a misap-
plication of the law as described in paragraph 2 of your letter.
An elected constable has jurisdiction only within the limits of his
district. Outside the boundaries of his district, except for certain
special situations, such as hot pursuit, he is not a constable and his
powers and duties are no more than any other citizen.
If you do not have a constable of your district duly qualified to
act, or for other good reason he cannot or should not execute certain
process (such as service of process on himself, or a close relative, or
someone or some business with whom he has a close interest and
therefore possibility of conflict of interest), then the process should be
sent to the sheriff in accordance with provisions of Section 11-9-107,
Mississippi Code of 1972. The record should show and the notifica-
tion to the sheriff should indicate this as the reason why such process
is being sent to the sheriff for his service.
In addition, in case of emergency, Section 11-9-101 would apply
wherein, if the constable or the sheriff or a deputy sheriff cannot be
had in time, you may appoint some reputable person to execute any
process, your being liable on your bond for all damage which may
result to a party to the cause or other person from his appointment of
an insolvent or incompetent person. Under such conditions, the
assignment must be made on an individual process basis (not blanket
assignment of all process for a period of time), and the records should
show why a regularly qualified constable or a sheriff and a deputy
sheriff is not available, and there is an emergency condition.
Sincerely,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
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OPINION NO. SO 79-10
SUBJECT. MUNICIPALITY AND COUNTY MAINTENANCE
OF STREETS. Sections 65-7-81 through 85, Miss. Code Ann. (1972)
provide the statutory authority for county maintenance of municipal
streets. Section 65-7-81 pertains to the board's rights once a highway
has been taken over by the state highway department. Section
65-7-83 pertains to the board's right to assume concurrent jurisdic-
tion with a municipality over certain streets. Section 65-7-85 pertains
to the right of the board of supervisors to expend monies on county
roads located within municipalities.
DATE RENDERED: February 17, 1978
REQUESTED BY: Hon. Sam S. Bass
OPINION BY. A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by S. E. Bird-
song, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
Attorney General Summer is in receipt of your letter of February
10, 1978, and has assigned it to me for research and reply.
Your letter stated:
This is to request an opinion as to the authority of the Leflore
County Board of Supervisors, or any one of the Supervisors, to act on a
request from the Greenwood City Council or the Commissioner of the
Street Department to furnish materials and labor at no cost to the City,
inside the corporate limits of the City, to repair streets and alleys.
Please note, if this authority exists, for which streets: state
highways, major thoroughfares, feeder arteries, any dedicated streets
and alleys, or undedicated streets and alleys.
Statutory authority for county maintenance of municipal streets is
found in Chapter 7 of Title 65 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, An-
notated.
Provisions of each section within this chapter pertaining to your
inquiry are set out below:
§ 65-7-81. State highways within or without municipalities.
The board of supervisors of any county in the state may construct,
reconstruct, maintain, or contribute to the construction, reconstruc-
tion, and maintenance of any state highway declared by legislative act
expressly to be such highway or which, in accordance with law, has
been taken over by the state highway department for construction,
reconstruction, or maintenance; and this section shall apply to such
state highway within as well as without the limits of any municipality
and, when within such limits, with or without the consent of the
municipal authorities. ...
§ 65-7-83. Assumption by counties of concurrent jurisdiction over
municipal streets for maintenance purposes.
The board of supervisors of any county may, by consent or agree-
ment with the proper governing authorities of any municipality within
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such county, assume concurrent jurisdiction over any street in such
municipality for maintenance purposes where such street is a con-
tinuation of or intersects a local or county road already under the
jurisdiction of such board of supervisors.
Such consent or agreement to the assumption of said concurrent
jurisdiction shall be entered into only by the entering of an order on
the minutes of both of said boards....
§ 65-7-85. Construction and maintenace by county of streets within
municipalities.
The several counties of the state, acting by and through the board
of supervisors thereof, are hereby invested, within their discretion,
with full authority to expend monies and to do, within any
municipalities of the county all acts regarding construction and
maintenance of roads and streets that they may do within the county
outside the limits of said municipalities.
The authority granted under this section shall be construed as addi-
tional and cumulative to all existing authority for the expenditure of
county funds within municipalities.
Trusting that the above will be of assistance to you, I am
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
S. E. Birdsong, Jr.
Special Assistant Attorney General
SEB,Jr./mg
OPINION NO. SO 79-11
SUBJECT. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY INSURANCE. Section
21-15-6, Miss. Code Ann. (1972) allows the governing authorities of
municipalities to purchase general liability insurance. Section
21-15-6 further provides that in the event a judgment is rendered
against a municipality, a judgment creditor shall have recourse only
to the proceeds of such liability insurance coverage. The existence of
such liability insurance may not be suggested at any time during the
course of the trial.
DATE RENDERED: February 17, 1978
REQUESTED BY: Hon. Kent F. Hudson
OPINION BY: A. F. Summer, Attorney General, by S. E. Bird-
song, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
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Attorney General Summer is in receipt of your letter of February
9, 1978, and has assigned it to me for research and reply.
Your letter states:
The City officials of Purvis are concerned about purchasing liabili-
ty insurance for the City. I would like to get your opinion as to
whether or not the City can purchase liability insurance, what types of
liability insurance are available to the City and if liability insurance is
purchasable, is it necessary to advertise each year before taking a
policy.
Authority for a municipal purchase of general liability insurance
is found in Section 21-15-6 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, An-
notated:
... . Purchase of general liability insurance coverage; effect on
municipal liability.
Municipalities are hereby authorized, in the discretion of the
governing authorities, to purchase general liability insurance
coverage, including errors and omissions insurance for municipal of-
ficials and municipal employees.
Nothing contained herein shall be considered as a waiver of im-
munity in whole or in part as to any governmental function attempted
or undertaken by the municipality except that where the municipality
has liability insurance coverage as to any action brought against it,
then such action may be maintained against such municipality, but
any recovery in such action shall be limited solely to the proceeds of
any such liability insurance coverage and a judgment creditor shall
have recourse only to the proceeds of such liability insurance
coverage. Any judgment rendered in excess of the limits of such in-
surance shall, on motion of the court, be reduced as to the municipali-
ty to the amount of said liability insurance coverage but not as to any
joint tort-feasor, if any. No attempt shall be made in the trial of any
case to suggest the existence of any insurance which covers in whole or
in part any judgment that may be rendered against any municipality.
As to what types of liability insurance are available, we suggest
consulting a reputable general insurance agent.
We are not aware of any statutory requirement that a municipali-
ty must advertise for bids for the purchase of any type of insurance.
Therefore, it is the opinion of this office that the governing
authorities of Purvis are not legally required to advertise for bids and
may negotiate for the purchase of liability insurance.
Trusting that the above will be of assistance to you, I am
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY:
S. E. Birdsong,




OPINION NO. SO 79-12
SUBJECT. PURCHASE OF LICENSE TAGS. Under Section
27-19-31, Miss. Code Ann. (Cum. Supp. 1978), the expiration month
for any vehicle acquired after November 1, 1976, shall be the month
prior to the registration month. This change does not alter the past
practice of purchasing license tags during October of each year if the
vehicle was acquired prior to November 1, 1976.
DATE RENDERED: February 7, 1978
REQUESTED BY: Mr. Chester H. Geiger
OPINION B Y. A. F. Summer, Attorney General
*Full text of Attorney General's Opinion is reprinted as follows:
I am in receipt of your letter of January 31, 1978, wherein you in-
quire about the law concerning expiration dates for Mississippi
license tags.
Accordingly, please be advised that prior to 1977 Mississippi law
provided that license plates expired on October 31 of each year. New
tags were required to be purchased during the month of October with
the new tax year beginning on the first day of November. This rule is
presently in effect for any vehicle that was owned on November 1,
1976. -However, in the 1977 Session of the Mississippi State
Legislature a law was enacted which in effect provides that the ex-
piration month for any vehicle acquired after November 1, 1976,
shall be the month prior to the registration month. Thus, if you
bought a vehicle in December, 1976, then the expiration month
would have been November, 1977. For your convenience, I am at-
taching a copy of the statute as it was in 1976 and also a copy of the
statute as amended in 1977.
On a personal note, I sincerely appreciate your comments con-
cerning the Rotary Club and agree with you wholeheartedly. I hope
that I have been of some service to a fellow Rotarian and look forward
to seeing you upon your next visit home.
With personal regards, I am
Very truly yours,
A. F. SUMMER
AITORNEY GENERAL
AFS:lm
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